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War I. Its main purpose is to describe and explain the process by which 
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In recent decades, economists and economic historians alike have turned their 
attention to the study of the relations that institutional development may have with the 
comparative economic performance of nations. One major conclusion of that discussion is 
that the success of national institutions depends to a large extent on the existence of 
consolidated national political systems. The vitality of institutions that provide services for 
                                                 
1 This text is the ‘Introduction’ to the book Cardoso and Lains (Eds.), which will be published 
by Cambridge University Press. The book has contributions from Martin Daunton (on Great 
Britain); Jan Luiten Van Zanden and Arthur Van Riel (the Netherlands); Richard Bonney 
(France); Mark Spoerer (Germany); Michael Pammer (Austria-Hungary); Giovanni Federico 
(Italy); Lennart Schön (Sweden); Francisco Comin (Spain); Cardoso and Lains (Portugal); 
and Larry Neal (Concluding chapter). We would like to thank comments from the authors and 
participants in the preparatory conferences held for the volume at the University of the Azores 
(2006) and the European University Institute (2008), as well as from Patrick O’Brien and 
Larry Neal. Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência Tecnologia and Instituto de 
Ciências Sociais, University of Lisbon, is gratefully acknowledged. The text was concluded 
while one of the authors (Lains) was Fernand Braudel Visiting Fellow at the EUI. 
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the management of particular fields of economic activity, such as transport networks, banks, 
or schools, are crucially dependent on the overall national institutional background provided 
by states. Yet the new institutional economics is at present bereft of a foundational theory for 
state formation. One way to overcome that deficit is to study the ways that liberal states were 
financed in nineteenth century Europe.  The reform of fiscal and financial systems at the end 
of the ancien régime and in the aftermath of nearly a quarter of a century of revolutionary 
warfare (1792-1815) was crucial for both the establishment of liberal regimes and the 
development of European economies in the century to l914. In this essay, we will firstly 
outline the history of the reconstruction of fiscal and financial regimes and, secondly, will 
look for patterns in the processes by which funds were obtained by the European states, as 
they responded to the new and evolving tasks of government throughout the long nineteenth 
century. 
Nineteenth century Europe was marked by sustained institutional and economic 
progress at national levels, as well as increasing exchanges of people, goods, capital and ideas 
at international levels. It was globally a century of peace. Between 1815 and 1914, the only 
wars that occurred were short and confined regionally. It was also the century in which nation 
states were consolidated or, in some cases, were formed. Because it was a century of peace 
and prosperity, the strengthening of states was compatible with increasing levels of 
institutional and economic integration across borders. Stronger liberal governments and the 
consolidation of national states open the way to a stronger international economy which on 
the other hand promoted the transmission of ideas related to the political economy of states2. 
The institutional developments that we observe had both a national and an international 
                                                 
2 Not unlike what happened during the process of European integration after the Second 
World War. See Milward (1992). See also Daunton and Trentmann (Eds.) (2004). 
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character. Nevertheless the success of the modern European state was crucially dependent on 
how it financed itself.  
By 1815, most European states were not new and the states that were thereafter 
formed were solidly grounded on past experiences of political integration (such as Italy and 
Germany)3. The nineteenth century was clearly a period when states increased their role in 
everyday social, political and economic life, as populations were converted from subjects to 
citizens. This transition had important roots in the past but gained momentum in the 
nineteenth century and the problems facing European liberal states then were different in 
many ways from the problems that the states had faced in previous centuries4. After 1815, 
central states became more liberal and closely connected with their populations. Governments 
imposed taxes and regulations, such as standard weights and measures or compulsory 
education, and provided security at domestic and international levels5. Taxation and 
regulations had to be accepted by the public. Acceptance became a crucial factor determining 
the success of the states and the speed with which they managed to implement policies. 
Levels of acceptance varied across time and space and depended on the capacities of states to 
supply services for its citizens. The level of political and occasionally military confrontation 
occurred more frequently in the poor countries of Europe, where states had more difficulties 
in providing their citizens with services because lower levels of institutional and economic 
development implied fewer resources for managing and funding government. Because of the 
reduction in war expenditures and despite the increase of state activity, tax burdens declined 
in several of the more developed economies, after 1815, whereas in the poorer economies 
                                                 
3 Crouzet (2003).  
4 For previous centuries, see Bonney (Ed.) (1995 and 1999), Neal (2004), Winch and O’Brien 
(Eds.) (2002) and O’Brien (2008). For the more recent periods, see Webber and Wildavsky 
(1986), Dincecco (2009a and 2009b) and, for the United States, Wallis (2000). 
5 Teichova and Matis (Eds.) (2000). See also Scales and Zimmer (Eds.) (2005). 
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they became proportionally heavier. The relative weight of taxation was linked both to levels 
of economic development and to the debt that had been accumulated before Waterloo. In 
many instances, such as was the case of the UK, that heritage weighed heavily on state 
finances and the management of public debt became a major institutional challenge. That was 
so particularly for states where considerable shares of their debts were raised on international 
capital markets, where the ability to borrow, as well as the price paid for loans, were 
dependent on the credibility of the state, both domestically and internationally.  
National case studies are the best basis upon which to construct a European framework 
for the analysis of these problems, because historical problems tend to appear as national in 
character and the sources are also fundamentally national. We have attempted to arrive at a 
taxonomy based on a number of case studies, each of which was taken as significant and 
illustrative of a wider European pattern. Historical processes can be best understood by 
systematically comparing experiences across time, regions and countries and it is necessary to 
generate a wider and deeper perspective on institutional developments that emerged 
everywhere in nineteenth century Europe.  
Such meta questions derive directly from Gerschenkron`s seminal work on European 
banking and have also been addressed for other institutional developments such as 
international finance, the building of railways networks and education6. We propose to 
address the rise of public finance systems in nineteenth century Europe and to emphasise on 
the following questions: how were tax regimes established; in what ways were they extended 
and deepened over time; what other forms of revenue continued or became available; how did 
governments secure compliance for their fiscal and financial policies; how was public debt 
raised and how did it evolve; with what degrees of efficiency did governments manage their 
                                                 
6 Gerschenkron (1962). See O’Brien (Ed.) (1983) and Milward (2005) on transports, Cameron 
(1972) and Kindleberger (1993), on banking and financial markets, and Tortella (Ed.) (1990), 
on education.  
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needs for credit and loans; how were public revenues spent; how was government activity 
evaluated by national citizens; how did the reputation of national governments evolve in the 
international markets; and, finally, what were the main theoretical and political debates 
around taxation and public finance?  
We investigate whether a comparative analysis will generate general insights and 
expose a European pattern for the evolution of taxation and public finance in the nineteenth 
century. Questions posed at a European level follow closely those that have been raised in the 
country studies, but go beyond national levels of enquiry. Hopefully we may provide some 
further hypothesis about taxation and public finance that will contribute to a better 
understanding of the problems involved and offer generalizations that transcend nineteenth 
century Europe. The fiscal and financial institutions of states are connected to policy making 
processes. They contribute to the shaping and design of economic policies and to assessment 
of their outcomes, at political, social and economic levels. A general overview of institutional 
settings for the implementation of public policies helps to explain cross-country variations in 
economic performance. We need to look “from one country to another for general 
explanations”7 and focus on countries or empires, which are representative of the European 
experience. The sample needs to include: a) early developers where sets of rules governing 
taxation and public finance had already reached some stability by the beginning of the 
century, namely Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden; b) countries for which the 
creation of such systems were crucial for the construction of the new nation-states, namely 
Germany, Italy and the Austria-Hungarian Empire; and c) countries which entered the modern 
age for taxation and public finance after major political revolutions, namely France, Spain and 
Portugal. This sample includes national economies of various levels of economic 
                                                 
7 See Kindleberger (1993, 3-4). See also Hatton, O’Rourke and Taylor (2007). 
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development, different levels of foreign and imperial connections, and of disparate size in 
terms of population and area, and geographical location.  
 
The ancien régime legacy  
 According to Schumpeter (1954), fiscal systems evolved from ‘domain states’ in 
antiquity to the ‘tax state’ in the Early Modern period, which aroused from the need of 
governments to raise money to pay for war8. Bonney (1995) and Bonney and Ormrod (1999) 
expanded the model to four stages, which included a ‘tribute state’, a ‘domain state’, a ‘tax 
state’ and, finally the ‘fiscal state’. Their approach updates Schumpeter’s taxonomy and offers 
a concept of gradual transition which accommodates fiscal reforms when new phases are 
reached. This is not a teleological process implying the completing of each stage of evolution 
in one sequence. Indeed, this is an open model that considers that it is possible for a given 
country to skip one of the stages of evolution and admits the co-existence of diverse national 
states at different fiscal stages in the same historical period. According to Bonney and Omrod 
(1999), by 1815, fiscal states ruled in most of Europe, which means that taxation was 
overwhelmingly controlled by central governments and geared to finance their goals. The 
centralization of public finances was to a large extent the outcome of the need to finance the 
almost permanent state of warfare in which the European states were engaged throughout the 
eighteenth century and in particular extensive warfare that followed the French Revolution 
(1789-1815). Warfare accounted for more than half of total expenditure in a number of 
European states throughout the century (Körner 1995a, 416). Wars were also financed by 
                                                 
8 This work was first published in 1918 in German. 
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raising public debt which accounted for an increasing share of total financial resources within 
the reach of the central state9.  
 The rise of fiscal states was associated with an increase in the ability of central states 
to manage the administrative apparatus to raise taxes, as well as the sophisticated financial 
institutions to manage public debt. The latter led to important financial innovations, such as 
the creation of central banks and the development of financial markets where bonds and other 
assets were traded (Körner 1995b, 532-35). These developments meant that states 
increasingly depended on its ability to service debt and concomitantly on their financial 
reputation. By increasing taxation to credits and loans, states became more dependent on the 
good functioning of financial and commodity markets. Disruptions to the economy meant 
lower revenues from taxation, and disruption in the financial markets meant that less public 
debt could be raised or that more taxes had to be allocated to pay for past debts. This higher 
level of dependency on the markets emerged by the end of the Napoleonic wars as a major 
problem for most European states. The creation of public debt as a means to cover public 
expenditure was linked to the capacities to increase the collection of tax revenues on a regular 
base. The main issue faced by the ancien régime was the management of the trade-off 
between the need to borrow, on the one hand, and the capacity to tax, on the other hand.  
Yet national tax systems were loosely integrated and suffered from many 
inconsistencies. The finances of ancien régime in European states reveal very different 
degrees of fiscal centralization. The structure and rates of taxation within the same political 
national unit varied considerably, either between urban or rural areas, or between different 
provinces. Taxes were imposed on domestic trade across regions and between rural and urban 
areas. Taxes were also mainly indirect, that is, based on the taxation of economic and in some 
                                                 
9 See for further discussion on this model, Petersen (1975), Krüger (1987), O’Brien (2008) 
and Spoerer (2008). 
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cases financial transactions. In England, for example, indirect taxes accounted for 70 percent 
of total taxes in the second half of the eighteenth century (Bonney 1995, 502). These ratios 
were however very disparate across Europe and moved in different directions. Tariffs on 
international trade weighted heavily on indirect taxation too. Direct taxes were also 
overwhelmingly fixed and thus not related to changes in the values of outputs, which implies 
that levels of direct taxation did not follow closely the economic cycle. Historically, the states 
fiscal institutions were geared to collecting taxes to pay for the administration of the state, the 
judiciary, the consumption of the aristocracy and mostly to pay for war, the military and the 
navy.  
The coercive functions of the state were not abandoned in the liberal age but their 
relevance declined substantially, as new functions related to universal law enforcement, the 
management of economic and monetary issues, investment in social overhead capital, health 
services and education emerged. The structure of state revenues also underwent 
transformation and adapted to the new sets of state functions. When dealing with the 
development of public finance in nineteenth century Europe, we need to understand how 
modern tax regimes were constructed at national levels and how they were made acceptable to 
the public. The notion of modernity in the organization of public finance is used here in the 
sense of enhancement and consolidation of the functions generally ascribed to fiscal states. 
These functions are usually associated to the management of new types of state revenues, 
based on both direct and indirect taxation, as well as to the administration of an expansionary 
state committed to increasing control over its territory, and to fostering public education, 
welfare, justice, investment in economic infraestructures and defense. This agenda called for a 
continuous increase in public spending, and above of all, to an efficient process of public debt 
creation, management and servicing. A new ability to extract taxation, a coherent program of 
public expenditure and a sound system of public debt management: these were the main 
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points featuring the substantial changes that contributed to the development of modern fiscal 
state in nineteenth century Europe. It should be noted that this is not the only available model 
to analyse the evolution of fiscal systems. An alterative framework is offered by Hinrichs 
(1966), who explains the transition from traditional society to modernity through changes in 
taxation systems. Traditional economies were characterized by restrict use of direct taxation, 
while in modern economies a regular system of taxation is an indispensable condition to 
finance increasing public expenditure. 
The state’s power to tax implies the existence of coercive means of government, as 
well as the tacit acknowledgement of the fiscal rules which direct the process of tax collecting 
(Bonney 1999, 6). The alternative to the predatory role of states associated mainly with period 
of crisis or warfare was the creation of economic opportunities in the marketplace, through 
cooperation between the state and the private sphere. The rent seeking processes associated to 
the negotiation of privileges and to the concession of special monopoly conditions exemplify 
the mastering of peaceful means of fiscal enforcement that are at the origins of the 
consolidation of modern fiscal states. The study of the evolution of public finance regimes in 
different European countries is a first step of inquiry that points to promising directions of 
research. National differences were undoubtedly important and explain certain dimensions 
and specific features of fiscal doctrines and taxation regimes in each of the countries 
considered10. However, our major concern is not only to explain how national regimes of 
taxation, expenditure and debt management were implemented during the nineteenth century, 
but also to elucidate the underlying economic and political interests that such regimes were 
serving or challenging, and how they were made acceptable to their societies.  
The conventional wisdom about the allegedly autonomous roles of states is built upon 
the claim that the State performs a variety of functions that are not subject to dispute, namely 
                                                 
10 See Kayaalp (2004). 
 10
those related to the pursuit of general objectives of well-being that serve society as a whole. 
The engagement with common good is certainly a strong caveat for the justification of the 
provision of public goods and services. However, it does not prevent us from recognizing the 
existence of vigorous interactions between governmental institutions and organized groups of 
interests in civil society. It is precisely such interactions that provide an explanation for the 
prevalence of redistributive tax policies in a certain historical context, while also serving to 
explain why in different settings preferences may emerge in support of policies for investment 
and economic growth. 
Public finance is about taxing, spending and balancing budgets. These activities are 
assigned to governments and it is therefore their mission to make the appropriate choices and 
to take the right decisions, bearing in mind the effects of such activities upon the welfare of 
their citizens. One may concede that governments have goals and an agenda which imply 
costs. The objectives of governments are made possible through a set of fiscal policy 
decisions designed to extract sufficient resources from the population under the state’s 
control. Limits to the growth of fiscal states depend on the ability to develop the tax bases 
without endangering social and political support, but also on the ability of governments to 
service and redeem the debt. In order to raise the amount of funds required to finance its 
activities, supposedly devoted to the common good, politicians and bureaucrats may be 
impelled by personal interests and are therefore subject to the rules of utility maximizing 
behavior. The agenda for public expenditure can also be appointed in ways that reveal the 
tendency of governments to excess spending to maximize future political results. These issues 
inform the public choice approach to the discussion of the functioning of different fiscal and 
financial regimes11. 
                                                 
11 See Buchanan (1979). On the continuity between certain types of public finance theory and 
the public choice approach, see Backhaus and Wagner (2005). The methodological and 
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When invited to explain the running of the political process, public choice theorists 
consider that governments are not organic or institutional entities that make decisions with an 
abstract public interest in their mind. By extending the methods of economics to the analysis 
of political decision making processes, public choice theorists emphasize the role of self-
interest and incentives acting as a main motivation for political action. For this reason, the 
study of the political decision structure and conditions within which taxing and spending 
choices are made is of a paramount relevance. The peculiarities of the political process 
elucidate the outcomes arising from changes in fiscal institutions (Wagner 2007). One may 
dispute whether or not a certain fiscal reform is an attempt to limit the role of the government 
or to control its impulsive tendency to increase spending, taking for granted the validity of 
Wagner’s law. Nevertheless, taxing and spending decisions should not be left to the 
arbitrariness of central and local governments acting in contexts of political constraint. 
According to the arguments put forward by public choice analysis, constitutional rules 
(common law, general legislation passed in Parliament and institutionalized values and 
traditions) form indispensable conditions for the creation of a reliable system of public 
finance. Furthermore, governments in modern societies are obliged to deal with increasingly 
complex sets of issues claiming for the formation and use of proper economic knowledge, 
which supports the process of legitimization or rejection of policy decisions12. Governments 
need to justify their actions on the basis of sound constitutional rules and credible economic 
reasoning. 
                                                                                                                                                        
conceptual differences concerning the interpretation of the economic functions of the 
government should not be dismissed, as is clearly shown in the debate between Buchanan and 
Musgrave (1999). The appeal to the public choice approach in the analysis of the functioning 
of state finance regimes has also been summarized in Bonney (1995) and Daunton (2001, 8-
9). 
12 On the contribution of economic knowledge to government decision-making, see Furner 
and Supple (Eds.) (1990). 
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When applying this type of approach to the nineteenth century realities, we may 
certainly find worthy attempts to create a kind of ‘fiscal constitution’ procedures designed to 
restrain expenditure and to make feasible the abolition of certain unpopular taxes and duties. 
Such was the case, in Britain, of Gladstone’s 1853 proposal to phase out the income tax, as a 
strategy to create ‘constitutional’ limitations to public spending13. However, nineteenth 
century classic contributors to the theory of public finance were more concerned with the 
ability to pay approach, viewing the problem of taxation as more or less independent of the 
process of determination of both the amount and the allocation of public expenditures. 
Though this approach did not reduce public finance to taxation, it has nevertheless imposed a 
separate account to both sides of the balance14. The success of the implementation and 
development of tax regimes across Europe had much to do with different levels of legitimacy, 
the credibility of governments and their budgetary policies, as well as with the outcome of 
those policies. In order to take those issues into account, we need to look at the evolution of 
political stability at the national level, as well as to the credibility of governments. Moreover, 
it is also necessary to take into account the efficiency of public expenditure in terms of the 
provision of public goods, including infrastructures, schooling, police and defense. One 
further aspect that can be better understood through a public choice approach is the issue of 
the economic interests represented by politicians, in their quality of ministers and members of 
the parliament15. 
 
                                                 
13 Baysinger and Tollison (1980) argue in favor of the coherence of that constitutional 
strategy, while Leathers (1986) claims that the project was condemned to failure. 
14 On the theoretical principles explaining this tradition, see the authors’ introduction to 
Musgrave and Peacock (1958). See also Dome (2004) for a survey of the fiscal problems by 
Enlightenment and Victorian British political economists.  
15 See Nehring and Schui (2007) and Schonardt-Bailey (2006). 
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Nineteenth century transformations16 
We will analyse the fiscal history of nine countries that represent about 90% of the 
total population and GDP of Europe to the East of Germany and Austria-Hungary, in 1900, 
and a wide variety of experiences in the field of public finances17. As we shall see, financial 
distress was common to both the poor South as well as to the wealthier cases of Britain and 
the Netherlands. The speed at which governments solved the problems inherited by debt 
representing the costs of wars varied significantly but again the divide was not between more 
or less developed countries, and depended on other factors, of a political or social nature. 
France for example did not have as a heavy debt inheritance as Britain, but the French 
governments throughout the century faced more difficulties in balancing the budget. The same 
was the case of Portugal and Spain. 
The major source of differentiation came from the degree of institutional development 
which depended on the ability of governments to reach some kind of consensus involving 
both the taxpayer and the purchaser of public bonds and other debts. The main task was to 
reach that consensus before creating the necessary institutions. In fact, as the century evolved, 
as the economies integrated and as the public became more educated, the creation of the 
institutions became within the reach of every country in Western and Southern Europe. When 
that consensus was reached, it was possible to find balanced solutions that satisfied the 
concerns of the tax payers and the borrowers as well as those of the state, at the central or at 
local levels. 
The case of Great Britain is highly revealing of the role of political coordination in 
governing public finances. Britain was in a difficult position in terms of state finances by the 
end of the Napoleonic wars. In 1815 government expenditure was a staggering 23% of 
                                                 
16 This section relies heavily on the country chapters in Cardoso and Lains (forthcoming). 
17 Maddison (2001). 
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national income. In that year, debt charges accounted for 26.6% of gross public expenditure, 
and climbed to 54.4% in 1825. In the eighteenth century, public expenditure and the national 
debt were taken by the public as the ‘bulwarks of liberty and Protestantism against the 
French’, as they were raised to a large extent to pay for past wars. Yet, having reached such 
large sums, the state could easily become the major threat for those liberties. Trust in the 
eighteenth century was higher in the UK than in France because the British state was more 
responsible in dealing with its financial affairs. But if trust were to be regained, the tax system 
had to change and it did so in the following decades.  
One factor that contributed to the recovery of trust was the fact that the fiscal pressure 
on the economy was considerably reduced throughout the following decades. That was made 
possible up to a certain point because Britain was no longer fighting the expensive wars of the 
previous century. Yet the reversal was only gradually achieved. By 1840, public expenditure 
was still high in contemporary terms (at 12.4% of GDP). Further reforms implied political 
initiatives and agreements across parties in Parliament which were achieved firstly with the 
reintroduction of the income tax by Robert Peel, in 1842, and carried further by Gladstone in 
the early 1850s. They and their successors also recognized that the fact that taxes, which were 
interlinked with votes, could introduce risks into the financial system. Thus they took care to 
implement sets of rules that would limit the capacity of governments and parliaments to over 
spend. By 1905, the cost of debt service was 16.6% of gross expenditure and total debt in 
relation to British GNP had fallen by 90%. There were other major changes, including the 
increase in the share of direct taxes to total revenues and changes of the structure of indirect 
taxes, which meant that the level of taxation became more intimately connected to the growth 
of the economy. The fact that the economy was growing although not as fast as in other places 
on the Continent provided a basis upon which trust could be recovered. Yet the major factor 
in that recovery was not the ability to tax in itself, but the ability to tax on an acceptable way, 
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linking the state with those who had to finance it. Such levels of trust were reached in some 
parts of Europe, whereas in other parts they were not and the reason why that was so becomes 
a major question in understanding the evolution of the modern European fiscal state.  
In the Netherlands ‘public finance reflects the balance of power between the social 
classes controlling the state and the basic institutions underlying its society and economy’. 
Thus the wider political setting necessarily has a large impact on how state finances evolved. 
There were three different phases, starting with a strong monarchy with limited parliament 
interference, from 1815 to about 1840, followed by two decades of ‘liberal offensive’, to the 
1860s, and a third period to the end of the century, which was above all marked by mass 
movements and the democratization of the society with the gradual extension of the franchise 
and the move to welfare. This last period coincided with the adoption of the gold standard by 
the Netherlands which partially determined the way the state was financed. As in Britain the 
status quo prior to 1815 had to be changed and was changed. Yet the set of problems that 
emerged in the following century was considerably different, mainly because levels of 
political pressure were higher, as the franchise expanded and the welfare state came into 
existence. The differences between the types of pressure imposed on both countries derive 
from specific national characteristics and we need to understand how the state managed the 
demands imposed on it by those who paid taxes and lend the money. 
The departing point was rather bleak, as the debt had amounted to an astonishing level 
of 147% of GDP, by 1814. However, the fiscal system inherited from the eighteenth century 
was already efficient, in the sense that it was centralized and well connected to a sophisticated 
‘commercial economy’. The annexation of southern Netherlands was another positive factor, 
as it enlarged the tax basis for the central state. Moreover, another source of revenue 
developed quickly, namely, revenues from the colonies. State finances remained highly 
problematic at the beginning of the century because Parliament was weak and state finances 
 16
were made a major political battlefield by the king, Willem I. In the following liberal period 
the needed reforms were effective implemented because of two factors that were 
paradoxically linked. The first is that the liberal governments ceased to act as though the 
Netherlands was a great power and military expenditure was substantially reduced. The 
second is that the colonies supplied revenues. It was also a great help that the economy 
continued to expand at a reasonable rate. But in the end the Netherlands lived throughout the 
century with a heavy debt and heavy interest payments, as in 1900, the debt amounted to 
about 80% of GDP and interests amounted to 35% of total government expenditure. One may 
speculate that trust had to be high as those high levels of indebtedness did not lead to public 
default. That is even more relevant if we take into account that the Netherlands was in the 
gold standard, and did not experience major macroeconomic problems, after 1875. Large state 
debts could thus coexist with political stability.  
In France, the health of public finances was intimately linked to levels of political 
stability. But the main determinants of how the state expanded its capacity and was financed, 
was the slow population growth and the ‘longevity of an oligarchic social order’ which was 
overrepresented in Parliament. Slow population growth meant that the fiscal basis of the state 
expanded only gradually. The existence of powerful oligarchies meant that they were able to 
slow down the rise of the state expenditure by opposing the development of direct taxation 
which affected their interests. By 1913, the size of the French state was half that of the 
German as a share of GDP. However, the financial problems of the state were particularly 
acute for most of the time, up to the war with Prussia. Ultimately, the growth of public 
expenditure was halted from the beginning of the 1880s onwards and that was a crucial 
element for the stabilization of the system. The central government was unable tax the whole 
territory of France and did not resort to local sources of taxation, in contrast to Germany. 
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Because tax revenues were harder to collect in France, a large part of state expenditure 
was paid for by the rise of public debt. Financial problems were rendered less serious because 
the economy grew rather fast, throughout the century, both in terms of total GDP and foreign 
trade. Also the banking system expanded and made an important contribution to funding the 
state by mobilizing domestic savings, and guaranteeing monetary stability and low interest 
rates. Monetary stability was a crucial and was strongly supported by the political elites, 
namely members of parliament who held rentes. The main basis of the rise of the state, 
however small that rise was, was not the increase in taxation but the rise of public debt. 
Excessive debt creation was avoided because total government expenditure remained low in 
comparison to other large countries, such as Britain and Germany. France looks like a case 
where reforming the fiscal constitution was not a priority of governments in the nineteenth 
century. The rise of state expenditures was particularly restrained and paid for by an 
expanding economy (although population did not increase significantly) or by debt creation 
which was well managed due to favourable monetary conditions. France is thus the case of a 
wealthy country which elites opted to have a small state. 
Countries integrating with new political units in the nineteenth century had a different 
set of problems. The growth and consolidation of central states was intimately linked to the 
process of political unification – and in some occasions was the single most important 
element of that process. A wide range of financial practices appear in the territories that 
ultimately would form the German Empire in 1871. In some of the smaller German territories 
the tax system was based on indirect taxes. In other territories taxes were predominantly 
‘impersonal’ and fell on property, like in Prussia. Changes occurred during the Napoleonic 
period and its aftermath, through the introduction of constitutions in some states, in the years 
from 1818 to 1849, which included norms about the administration of public finances. 
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Meanwhile, the creation of the Zollverein, in 1833, also led to a higher degree of integration 
and the unification of tariffs on foreign trade. 
When the German Empire was created, in 1871, some degree of institutional 
convergence had already been achieved but the tax regimes and economic and financial 
conditions remained very different. The Empire did not, however, manage to unify them. The 
central government became responsible for defence and international relations and needed a 
smaller tax base than elsewhere in Europe, where central governments exercised a wider 
range of functions. The central government collected customs revenues and managed state 
monopolies such as the post office. Member states could be called upon to help finance the 
central government in case of need and that effort was distributed on a per capita basis. The 
share of military expenditure declined throughout the nineteenth century but increased again 
in the decade preceding World War I, while expenditures on education, administration, 
utilities, transport and welfare expanded considerably and these were mostly covered by the 
budgets of member states or the municipalities.  
In the Austria-Hungarian Empire, the devolution of power under the 1867 
Compromise impacted on the administration and evolution of public finances in the two 
halves of the empire. This compromise led to the creation of two states with independent 
political and fiscal institutions. Like Germany, the Austria-Hungarian central government 
after 1867 managed defence and international relations. However, unlike Germany, revenues 
were collected by the two governments of Austria and Hungary which would then reallocated 
to a central military and diplomatic budget according to quotas that were negotiated every 10 
years. The contribution of the Austrian government was never below 73% which implied a 
small albeit politically relevant redistribution effect.  
The transition from the pre- to the post-compromise fiscal arrangements implied 
important institutional developments particularly in the case of Hungary which had to 
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converge institutionally to the more developed Austrian fiscal system. Thus, for example, the 
share of direct taxes in the Hungarian public revenues increased steeply even before 1867. 
Clearly there was an objective of political harmonization which was absent elsewhere in the 
other two large European countries, namely Germany and, as we shall see below, Italy. The 
partition of expenditures was linked to the relative size of the population. The Empire’s 
common budget was dominated by military expenditures. In addition to the common budget, 
both states had to pay for the debt incurred before 1867. Overall, public finance contributed to 
the integration of the two halves of the Empire. The initial steps of integration were taken 
during the ‘neo-absolutist’ period from 1848 to the 1867 Compromise, but fiscal integration 
proceeded despite the fact that there was an increase of political autonomy of the separate 
kingdoms. Fiscal policy, by way of investments on education and infrastructure also 
contributed to integration within a dual Monarchy. Whether this was an express purpose or 
just a means of gaining political support for the central government remains an open question. 
Of all the states that would form Italy after 1861, only Piedmont had significant levels 
of taxation and expenditure. Its ambitions materialized in the form of growth of public 
administration and investments in public infrastructures, namely railways, paid for by taxes 
and also by the issue of sovereign debt. Increased taxation in Piedmont was made possible by 
institutional reforms, including the introduction of yearly budgets controlled by the 
Parliament, and the increase in the levels of taxation on consumption, land, on interest from 
capital and wages. Yet the increase in taxation did not match the increase in public 
expenditure and the debt surged. Piedmont was responsible for more than half of the total debt 
of Italian states in the 1850s, and that share increased even further after the wars against 
Austria from 1859-1861. 
After unification Piedmont introduced to the rest of Italy its ambitious development 
policies, which led an increase in public debt and then to difficulties in servicing it. A decade 
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of reducing expenditures then unfolded, and from mid-1870s onwards Italy’s state budget was 
kept relatively balanced. The Italian government was, however, able to increase taxation 
throughout the rest of the period down to the World War I. Firstly that implied an increase of 
revenues to GDP but after 1890 Italy entered a period of economic boom and the ratio of 
taxation to GDP actually declined. Despite such achievements, Italian financial history is 
marked by promises by successive governments to reduce the deficit and the debt, and attacks 
from the opposition parties accusing governments of not being able to achieve that goal. Yet, 
the deficit to GDP ratio averaged just 0.64% in the whole period, peaking at higher levels of 
about 3% only after the 1861 war, and re-emerging in the 1880s. Although the state budget 
was never on a ‘firm ground’, it also never ‘fell into abyss’, as fiscal policy was successively 
adapted and revised so that revenues could rise to meet expenditures. There was a major 
reason behind such a consistent position of Italian governments which was the fact that sound 
financial policies were the basis for financing of the military and the achievement of great 
power status. Public expenditures were, however, not a unifying factor. On the contrary, 
unification meant the tax load of the poorer South increased. During the early 1910s, some 
changes were introduced, namely through the centralization of education expenditures, which 
had some small redistributive effects.  
The northern European periphery was in many instances different from the southern 
peripheries, as it had high levels of political stability and also a more developed economy and 
institutional setting. In Sweden, public finances went through a thorough institutional 
transformation during the nineteenth century, which was relatively smooth and negotiated 
with different political forces. Sweden started the century with a fiscal regime with many 
ancien régime characterises, which included some taxes of medieval origin, based above all 
on indirect taxation, and with a large share of expenditure devoted to the army. But then it 
evolved into a modern fiscal regime based on the taxation of income and monetary 
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transactions. Such transformations meant that the structure of the fiscal regime adapted to the 
wider transformations in the structure of the economy. The starting point was bleak if taken 
out of context, given that Sweden emerged from the Napoleonic wars with a large public debt 
and relatively high shares of expenditures and revenue in national income, although still much 
smaller than elsewhere in Europe. Yet in the years to about 1850 that would change 
considerably. The share of revenues and expenditures were reduced from about 10% to about 
5% of GDP, between the early and mid nineteenth century, and public debt was reduced even 
further. The reduction of military expenditures was the key factor in the overall reduction of 
public expenditures.  
From the 1850s on the size of government started to increase again but this time 
geared to other kind of modernizing expenditures. Increase in wealth and a political consensus 
led Sweden through a velvet revolution to become a ‘development state’. The rise of 
expenditures was however not immediately followed by substantial institutional reforms, 
which gained momentum only from the 1870s onwards. By 1900 90% of the state revenue 
was still based on indirect taxation, including a large share of revenues from customs duties. 
The speed of reforms was not conditioned by political conflict which was relatively low and 
the increasing role of Parliament in the design of fiscal policies contributed largely to that 
outcome. As the economy expanded and went through considerable structural 
transformations, the gap between the fiscal structure and the economy became more evident 
without however causing institutional problems. True change in the fiscal structure came only 
in the early twentieth century and in that decade the share of the income tax in total revenues 
was raised to 25%. Again the change was led by parties in Parliament with high levels of 
political representation. The tax reforms took however decades of public investigations 
engaging economists and political scientists since taxes and political voting rights were 
intricately interwoven. 
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Spain was a case where the transition from ancien régime fiscal structure to one in 
tune with the needs of an expanding economy was far from smooth and was achieved with 
high degrees of political tension. The period of political instability lasted down to the 1870s 
and that made fiscal reforms particularly hard to implement. Liberal tax reforms were linked 
to successive plans for constitutional reform and were attempted in 1813, 1821 and 1845. The 
1845 reform introduced a rather complex tax system, based on quotas, set by Parliament, for 
the central government, the provinces and the municipalities, which reflected the complex 
administrative system of the Spanish Kingdom. The reform was mildly successful as budgets 
became approved annually in Parliament, the fiscal system as envisaged became more 
centralized, the privileges of the nobility were abolished, and some proportionality was 
introduced. But the new system was composed of a large array of indirect taxes which 
certainly made it difficult to estimate revenues and deficits. It was followed by a slight 
increase of the fiscal pressure from 7.8 to 8.5% of GDP, between 1850 and 1865. The 
structure of public spending also changed, as military expenditures were somehow reduced 
whereas expenditures on education and public infrastructure increased.  
The success of the reform was soon to be checked by the aggravation of political 
instability which affected the collection of revenues, led to the increase in expenditures, and 
reduced the role of Parliament in controlling the budget. Instability became common for most 
of the second half of the nineteenth century, on somehow reduced scale after the end of the 
short republican experience, in 1874. A period of other reforms followed. The Bank of Spain, 
founded in that year, was granted the monopoly of note issue in return for lending to the 
government. Printing money became a source of revenue for the public budget which 
ultimately led to the abandonment of the gold standard by Spain in 1883. In the following 
years, state revenues increased as did expenditures, deficit and the debt. The debt was 
financed domestically, which may have had a negative impact on the private capital markets, 
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and about 25% was financed abroad. A new tax reform was implemented in 1900, this time 
slightly more successful, leading to a substantial modification of the tax structure and 
ultimately to government surpluses from 1903 to 1908 in the eve of the war in Morocco, 
which was followed by another period of political instability. The debt service accounted for 
8.1% of total expenditure in 1849, peaked at 52.6% in 1870 and then declined to 31% in 
1913.  
The fiscal history of nineteenth century Portugal was also largely marked by severe 
political instability. Military confrontations ended in 1834 but some level of political stability 
was achieved only after 1851 and only then serious attempts to reform the fiscal state 
inherited by the ancien régime could be made. By mid-century the government in Lisbon did 
not have full control over its territory, in terms of military security, ability to tax income or 
trade, or to enforce legislation. The task of state building was harder, because in many 
instances the presence of the central government had to be built anew and not by reforming 
existing local institutions. To engage in the tremendous efforts of state building, the 
governments in Lisbon had to raise financial resources which meant that it was of paramount 
importance to build an efficient fiscal system. This was a task that was never fully 
accomplished and the history of nineteenth century Portugal is also partially the history of that 
process. Many would argue that an efficient and just fiscal system was not fully accomplished 
because people in government were too busy with their own private interests and less 
concerned with the public good. Yet, to understand this problem we also need to take into 
account the vast dimension of the tasks involved. 
Figures 1 to 3 quantify the extent of converging and diverging features of the 
European states we have just reviewed. They show a general rise in the shares of revenues to 
total GDP, a convergence of the shares of expenditure in GDP to levels between 7 and 15 
percent. The most important divergence in terms of how state finances were managed lye in 
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that share of debt as percent of GDP. Such differences appear not only as we compare 
countries but also across time. Austria-Hungary had a higher debt than France before the 
Compromise (1867), but then the two countries evolved in a similar way. Two countries 
appear as quite different from the rest, namely Spain which registered two spurts of public 
debt, whereas Sweden managed to have very low debt ratios throughout the period. 
[Figures 1 to 3] 
 
Patterns of European convergence and differentiation 
Nineteenth century European history was clearly marked by the rise of the state as a 
political and economic actor. We need to understand how that rise was financed and provide a 
European answer to the question which will necessarily come in the form of a complex set of 
different responses. There is of course no European model and also no ideal model. National 
models were however gradually defined, as the functions of states were largely centralized, 
even when there was some sort of regional distribution of the administrative functions. No 
national model dominated or was even exported from one nation to the other. Moreover, there 
was also no national model that proved to be ideal or dominant in terms of efficiency or 
geopolitical outcomes. Thus the European answer to the question of how the liberal state 
came to be financed is the sum of different national outcomes. 
But there was a European pattern defined by the prosecution of forms of financing 
government activity by taxing the economy efficiently and by servicing political and social 
consensus. The concern with efficiency is reflected in the search for policies that relate levels 
of taxation to the rhythm of economic activity. Concomitantly, tariffs were perceived to be a 
poor source of revenue compared to taxes on domestic activity. The concern for consensus is 
reflected in the option for systems based on the backing of parliaments and which were not 
regressive and possibly generated some social and regional redistribution effects. There is also 
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a pattern where most governments and political forces considered that the public deficit and 
the public debt should be held at the minimum levels, as large debts could undermine political 
systems. And there were other less generalized sources of convergence in fiscal matters, 
namely, the idea that the state could raise money to fund certain types of investment in social 
overhead capital and education. There was also convergence in the reduction of levels of 
expenditures on defense, although that occurred more rapidly in some countries than in others. 
But differences were more important, particularly concerning the institutional forms 
the conduct of tax policies could have18. Domestic political institutions developed according 
to different political and institutional experiences, as institutions were intimately connected 
with the past practices in the realm of public finances. The nineteenth century is markedly 
different from previous centuries in the field of public finances. Yet the past inheritance had a 
relevant role in the shaping of the nineteenth century tax policy and tax institutions. Different 
financial systems had been developed in Holland, England and France between Westphalia 
and Waterloo (Neal 2004). England may have been a good model for an eighteenth century 
state but it certainly was not for the nineteenth century, simply because the increasing role of 
the state meant that it had to be more in tune with national institutional and other 
characteristics19. Moreover, the institutional format of taxation also responded to differences 
in how states were formed. If we look at the widest range of cases, from Britain to Austria-
Hungary and from Sweden to Portugal, we may conclude that each state had concerns and 
purposes of its own. Thus taxation reflected the strong divergence in terms of institutional 
                                                 
18 See Steinmo (1993, 12-13). 
19 Grossman (2001, 461-2) tellingly asks: “Why have the British institutions of Commons, 
Lords and constitutional monarchy, or the American variant of Congress, Supreme Court, and 
president, not been readily transferable to other nations? The answer, I think, is that the 
British legacy of a state that protects property rights and that is accountable to its citizens is 
not attributable to institutional design. Rather, the key to the British legacy, starting with the 
success of the Glorious Revolution of 1689, is its foundation on a consensus of the citizenry.”   
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responses to the same type of problems at the European level. Different regimes were the 
outcome of different stages of state building and also different levels of economic 
development. The case studies in this volume show that no modern liberal state, including the 
British, which was widely appraised by contemporaries, could be replicated elsewhere, 
because historical legacies narrow the range of political options, as shown in the last chapter 
for this book. 
Public finances were an instrument to construct public policies. The degree of ‘failure’ 
or ‘success’ of governments in dealing with deficits and debts were not an outcome of levels 
of institutional development but rather an outcome of policy options. Britain balanced its 
budget because that represented the equilibrium of power between parties and between the 
Parliament and the government. France was not too concerned to reduce rising deficits and 
debt because changing that would imply a change in the relative strength of political forces. A 
sound monetary system, facilitated by the growing economy and the development of the 
banking sector, helped the fulfilment of that path and implied that the burden of the debt 
remained manageable. Germany developed a three-tier system which central, state and 
municipal levels of government, the later being remarkably autonomous. The central 
government was more preoccupied with defence and the state and municipal governments 
with economic and social issues. The system provided the needed funds for the three levels. 
When comparing Spain and Portugal with Sweden we have to conclude that the main problem 
was not the ability to reform in itself but the ability of the state to tax the economy even with 
the old institutional framework. In Sweden the low levels of political dispute and high levels 
of political stability enabled the state to increase the levels of taxation of the economy until 
the very end of the century within the institutions inherited from the ancien regime. This is an 
important conclusion because it helps clarify the counterfactual with which many 
contemporaries and historians have worked. The absence of reforms was just another aspect 
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of the incapacity of the state to tax. The analysis of the sources of that incapacity to tax is 
what we should concentrate our attention upon. It is important to notice that the reformation 
of the old tax regime in Sweden was not a paramount issue in the political debate as we will 
find in other parts of the European periphery or, for that matter, in France.  
The history of nineteenth century public finance was interrupted by the First World 
War which caused many distresses in the domestic and the international order, at all levels. 
During the interwar period, economic, institutional and political divergence ensued, 
notwithstanding the development of some points of ideological convergence. Thus the 
development of the efficient state was interrupted. Such developments were resumed after the 
Second World War but then Europe became clearly divided by the “Iron Curtain”. But in the 
West developments proceeded again with generally common purposes in terms of the role of 
the states and generally different institutional solutions. It may be the case that the level of 
institutional integration is higher now than it was in the nineteenth century. However fiscal 
and financial institutions are still far from integrated. That is probably the reason why, after 
having achieved the single market, the European Union has still not made any serious 
attempts to introduce a common fiscal policy. 
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Figure 1 – Government revenue as percent of GDP  
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Figure 2 – Government expenditure as percent of GDP 
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Figure 3  – Public debt as percent of GDP 
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